



G.D. GOENKA MODEL UNITED NATIONS'22

PROJECT BROWN SUN

BACKGROUND GUIDE



REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL.....

FREEZE DATE: 1959

LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER

Greetings

The world we know today is engulfed in rapacity and animosity. The disparity between great men and women, between different faiths and different opinions had resulted in the great war whose ramifications are still being faced by people today. The ramifications of parlous bomb dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima were disastrous and a devastating blow to the humankind. With great regret, I write this letter to inform you that India has been succumbed to such despair facets; it has found itself being threatened by a belligerent neighbour. The border skirmishes have exacerbated the effervescent relationship we once shared.

As I indite this letter, I find my thoughts convoluting and in moral agony. Our decision to build the bomb may lead to a safer India or it might be the inception of a pugnacious weapons race which would be unjust to our poor populace vying for social and economic welfare. The feeling of antediluvian and racial superiority has tormented us for years; the feeling of animosity if festered by our actions will torment our future. My fellow men, we have shared our thought for years now; let us now share action. I call upon each one of you to attend the meeting of the Project Brown Sun to decide the fate of the nation.

Jawaharlal Nehru

Documentation

- Press releases: Press releases are documents which are released to the media and convey information from the committee to the rest of the world. They influence public opinion on various matters and can console or infuriate the people depending on their content.
- Directives: They are orders given to other institutions (for example army, navy, police, intelligence/agencies, etc.) to carry out a certain action.
- Strategic decisions: These are major policy decisions taken on behalf of the nation. They can range from declarations of war to an invitation to form an alliance. Since they possess much gravity, strategic decisions must be passed by the committee as a whole, or as an executive action.
- Policy statements: These are statements which are made by leaders or, in this case, people in positions of power; they expose the portfolio's official stance which may be used as tangible motive to justify reaction in the committee.
- A note about documentation: While strategic decisions must be passed by the committee as a whole, other forms of documentation may be sent to the Executive Board unilaterally. However, specifically with directives, delegates must keep in mind that the relevant documentation can only be sent by the portfolios who have the executive power to send that documentation. Other delegates can/draft the documentation, but it will not be considered valid without the signature of the

relevant portfolios. For example, any movement of troops will require the authorisation of the military officer concerned, or will need the committee to pass a strategic decision on these lines.

SALIENT POINTS TO REMEMBER

- Relationship with other members of the Cabinet:

The delegates must realise that the relationships their portfolios had with each other during the timeline of the committee will act as their foreign policy. They are urged to keep this in mind especially while lobbying with other delegates.

- Executive Powers:

Each delegate must be aware of their executive power and jurisdiction. They are, however, some portfolios who do not have executive powers in the committee.

- Research and application:

The beauty of a crisis committee is that it lays equal emphasis on research and spontaneous thinking. Delegates are expected to have a good understanding of the foreign predilections of the portfolio, trade conditions, political scenario and recent history of British India.

- Resolution:

There will be no resolution drafted or passed. The committee ends with the end of the storyline and succeeds or fails depending on whether the delegates are successful in tackling most of the crisis.

All events past the Freeze Date have not occurred and they cannot be referred to or cited in the committee.

REGARDING POSITION PAPERS

The Individuals invited to the PROJECT BROWN SUN are expected to reply to the letter sent out by the PRIME MINISTER as soon as possible. They must highlight their stance on the crisis update as well as mention their policy or opinions regarding the agenda. This letter would be in the format of a position paper.

It is important to note that the letter should contain the personal opinions of the individual and his beliefs on the crisis and the other things mentioned above. The members are also expected to present possible solutions to the crisis and a brief/rudimentary plan of action. A few things to keep in mind are:

- Exploiting the flexibility that comes with a crisis committee (and to keep things a bit riveting and intriguing), delegates must write their position paper as a letter replying to the Prime Minister.
- The position paper must be written by keeping the opinions and beliefs of the portfolio in mind. These beliefs can be explicitly highlighted.
- All events, policies, relationships, etc mentioned in the position paper must be before the freeze date: 1959.

The position paper should include three to four paragraphs and each paragraph should mention the following:

- Paragraph 1: Overview or Introduction of your portfolio and the intensity of the crisis update.
- Paragraph 2: Description of your portfolio's stance on the crisis update;
- Paragraph 3: Solutions to the crisis update.

Delegates are requested to send their position papers by 14th October 2022 to the email mentioned below. To Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru: karmanyawahi@gmail.com

KEY ASPECTS AND EVENTS

The Nehruvian Era was a period of voluntary nuclear abstinence. Nehru was not only deeply committed to the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, but also opposed their manufacture and possession by any state, including India. He was opposed to nuclear weapons on moral, political and strategic grounds, calling their possession a "crime against humanity". He integrated this opposition into India's foreign policy, giving it an activist edge.

Nehru was the first world leader to call for an end to all nuclear testing following US bomb tests in the Pacific in 1954. However, India's civilian nuclear energy programme under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) also had a dual-use capacity; major figures such as Homi Bhabha were not unaware of this. Bhabha himself was not as categorically opposed to a possible future Bomb as was Nehru.

On July 24, 1957, Nehru said in the Lok Sabha:

We have declared quite clearly that we are not interested in making atom bombs, even if we have the capacity to do so and that in no event will we use nuclear energy for destructive purposes...I hope that will be the policy of all future governments.

However, there was a change in Nehru's weltanschauung in 1959 wherein serious thought was put into the development of an atomic bomb.

Origin of India's Nuclear Weapon Program

The first step was taken by Dr. Homi Jehangir Bhabha in March 1944 when he submitted a proposal to the Sir Dorab Tata Trust to establish a nuclear research institute, over three years before independence and a year before the first nuclear weapon test.

This led to the creation of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) on 19 December 1945 with Bhabha as its first Director. The new government of India passed the Atomic Energy Act, on 15 April 1948, leading to the establishment of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) not quite one year after independence. At that time Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru declared:

"We must develop this atomic energy quite apart from war - indeed I think we must develop it for the purpose of using it for peaceful purposes. ... Of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way."

This note of ambivalence in Nehru's speech foreshadowed his policies on nuclear research for the next decade. Nehru took a prominent role in international politics, founding the Non-Aligned Movement, and advocating nuclear disarmament.

In 1954 the Indian nuclear program began to move in a direction that would eventually lead to establishment of nuclear weapons capability. On 3 January 1954 the IAEC decided to set up a new facility - the Atomic Energy Establishment, Trombay (AEET). On 3 August 1954 the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was created with Bhabha as Secretary. This department answered directly to the Prime Minister and has continued to do so down to the present day.

The program grew swiftly. The atomic energy budget increased 12-fold from 1954 to 1956. By 1958 the DAE consumed one third of India's research budget. By 1959 AEET employed over one thousand scientists and engineers.

In 1955 construction began on India's first reactor, the 1 MW Apsara research reactor, with British assistance. And in September 1955, after more than a year of negotiation, Canada agreed to supply India with a powerful research reactor - the 40 MW Canada-India Reactor (CIR). Under the Eisenhower Administration's "Atoms for Peace" program the US agreed to supply 21 tons of heavy water for this reactor in February 1956, and the reactor was dubbed the Canada-India Reactor, U.S. or CIRUS.

The acquisition of Cirus was a watershed event in nuclear proliferation. Although the sale was made with the understanding that the reactor would only be used for peaceful purposes, it occurred before any international policies were in place to regulate such technology transfers and no provision for inspections were made. And in fact, India was careful to ensure that no effective regulation would accompany the reactor. India refusing to accept fuel from Canada for the reactor and set up a program to manufacture the natural uranium fuel for Cirus indigenously so as to keep complete control of the plutonium produced there. This program, led by metallurgist Brahm Prakash, succeeded in developing the techniques for producing the precisely manufactured, high purity material demanded by the reactor.

The reactor was a design ideal for producing weapons-grade plutonium, and was also extraordinarily large for research purposes, being capable of manufacturing enough plutonium for one to two bombs a year. The Atomic Energy Establishment, Trombay was formally inaugurated by PM Nehru on 20 January 1957.

Apsara, fueled by enriched uranium from the UK, went critical on 4 August 1957, becoming the first operating reactor in Asia outside of the Soviet Union (though only days ahead of Japan's first reactor). Cirus achieved criticality at BARC on 10 July 1960.

In July 1958 PM Nehru authorized project Phoenix to build a plant with a capacity of 20 tonnes of fuel a year - sized to match the production capacity of Cirus. The plant was based on the U.S. developed Purex process and an American firm, Vitro International prepared the plans for it.

In 1960 Kenneth Nichols, a former U.S. Army engineer who played significant roles in the Manhattan Project, represented Westinghouse in discussions on power plant construction. In a meeting with Nehru and Bhabha, Nichols relates that Nehru turned to Bhabha and asked:

"Can you develop an atomic bomb?" Bhabha assured him that he could and in reply to Nehru's next question about time, he estimated that he would need about a year to do it. ... He

concluded by saying to Bhabha "Well, don't do it until I tell you to."

INDO-CHINA RELATIONS

Suspecting India of having a hidden agenda on Tibet, China gave no space, minced no words and told India not once, but several times, that Tibet was its internal affair and it would not tolerate any interference from India. India's lack of understanding of the depth of China's sentiments against the Simla Convention (which determined the status of Tibet in 1914) was a key problem. Beijing argued it had not signed the treaty, treated it as an unequal pact, and blamed it on the imperial legacy. When China squeezed India out of Tibet in the Panchsheel agreement of 1954, Nehru called the five principles "wholesome" and erroneously described it as "a very important event".

Even when China was seen to be more sensitive to Pakistan's concerns at the cost of India's, Delhi ignored it. China went to the extent of describing India's relations with Bhutan as part of the dark vassal system, and said the UN should examine what China called Bhutan's enslavement. Tibet's revolt in 1956 against Chinese occupation too was blamed on India.

Yet, despite clear negative signals, Nehru remained anxious to protect the illusion of a bhai bhai relationship, keeping the contradictions in their relations hidden from the people. This was possible in the pre-internet age, when the only source of information was the government and what it chose to dish out was the only news available to the public.

On the question of borders, which proved the Achilles' heel and where accommodation of each other's point of views was essential, and China showed flexibility, Nehru remained rigid. He declared that India's borders were what they were, map or no map, ignoring the many infirmities that existed.

In the eastern sector, the McMahon Line, set up as the border between Tibet and India in 1914, ceded the area called Tawang to India. But this remained under Tibetan occupation until 1951, when India finally occupied it.

In the western sector, the border in the Aksai Chin area was undefined in the Survey of India maps when India became independent in 1947, and continued to be undefined when the maps were reprinted in the subsequent years. In 1954, after the agreement on Tibet had been signed, Nehru issued instructions to withdraw the old maps and print new ones, showing a firm line as India's border that would not be open for discussion with anyone.

But remember, this was an international border and needed consultations/discussions with the other stakeholder before a line was drawn. Nehru, however, remained uncompromising and would insist that the border was well-known by usage and custom and by the principle of watershed; and, hence, there was no need for fresh surveys and China should expect it. This led to a conflict as it was unrealistic on our part to expect no retaliation.

Unfortunately, Nehru himself was not sure of India's borders. He said in Parliament, on December 8, 1959, that, in hindsight, he and his ministry had doubts about India's position. Still, he said that India should hold its position, the lapse of time and events would confirm it, and by the time a challenge came, India would be in a much stronger position to face it.

A couple of months earlier, on October 28, 1959, foreign secretary Subimal Dutt said, "The Sikkim-Tibet boundary delimited in 1896 was the only boundary along the entire frontier which was properly delimited." Distilled to the core, what this meant was that out of the entire stretch of an almost 3,500 km boundary line, only 220 km were delimited, and there was an obvious need to delineate the remaining boundary too.